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_THUMBS ON THE SCALE: THE
ROLE THAT ACCOUNTING
PRACTICES PLAYED IN THE
SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS
RICHARD C BREEDEN*
INTRODUCTION
rT'o savings and loan crisis began because thrift institutions were
X poorly designed financial intermediaries that became increasingly
vulnerable to competitive pressures, greater volatility in interest rates,
and other changes in the economic environment in which they operated.
Then, at a time when the thrift industry was economically insolvent, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") encouraged the industry to
grow out of its problems, hoping that growth through the accumulation
of higher yielding assets would offset losses on existing mortgage assets.
By greatly reducing capital requirements and continuing to make under-
priced federal deposit insurance available even to economically insolvent
institutions, the regulators provided thrift owners with every incentive to
engage in aggressive growth by speculating with taxpayer dollars. Be-
sides causing the thrift industry to attract more than its share of fraudu-
lent operators, this policy led to ruinous expansion which greatly
increased the ultimate losses to the government.
Although a variety of economic, political, and regulatory forces con-
tributed to the thrift crisis, this article will focus on the key role played
by the misuse of accounting standards. In order to implement its policy
of regulatory forbearance, the FHLBB sanctioned unsound accounting
practices that operated to inflate the calculation of thrift capital and
earnings. By creating the appearance that troubled thrift institutions
were in compliance with capital requirements, these accounting stan-
dards concealed or minimized the magnitude of the problems facing the
* Mr. Breeden is the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Phillip D. Parker, Associate General Counsel of the Commission, assisted in
researching, drafting and revising this article. His contribution and counsel have been
invaluable on this article and these issues.
This speech was given by Chairman Breeden as part of the annual Fimancial
Institutions and Regulation Symposium at the Fordham University School of Law.
The Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private
publication or statement by any of its members or employees. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of other members of the
Commission or the staff.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
industry. As a result, thinly capitalized or insolvent institutions were
permitted to pay dividends out of capital, make acquisitions, pay lavish
salaries and engage in aggressive growth.
It is doubtful that financial regulators should have permitted the con-
tinued operation of troubled thrift institutions. Far worse, however, was
the decision of those regulators to foster accounting principles designed
to allow deceptive measurements of net worth. The purpose of account-
ing standards is to assure that financial information is presented in a way
that permits investors, creditors, and other users to make informed judg-
ments. If we learn nothing else from the thrift crisis, it should cause us
to recognize that accounting standards should never be subverted to ac-
commodate the perceived needs of a particular industry. The accounting
practices adopted by thrift regulators created the appearance that thrift
institutions were operating on a safe and sound basis, but they did not-
and could not-change the underlying business realities.
The first section of this article describes how the reduction of capital
requirements and business expansion fueled the thrift crisis. Section II
describes how improper accounting practices facilitated the policy of per-
mitting thinly capitalized or insolvent institutions to expand. Section III
discusses why financial regulators should not be responsible for adminis-
tering the federal securities laws with respect to the financial institutions
they regulate, and then briefly reviews current initiatives to mandate a
broader use of market value accounting by financial institutions.
I. THE ROLE OF CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND BUSINESS
ExPANsION IN THE THRIFT CRISIS
A. Setting the Stage for Growth
The assets of savings and loan institutions traditionally were concen-
trated in long-term, residential mortgage loans at fixed rates of interest.
These mortgage loans were largely funded by short-term deposits. Due
to the fundamental maturity imbalance between their long-term assets
and their short-term liabilities, thrift institutions were inherently vulner-
able to interest rate fluctuations. For decades, the borrow short, lend
long construct of the thrifts represented good politics, but not good eco-
nomics or sound financial structure.
At the same time, federal law capped the rate of interest that could be
paid on bank and thrift deposits. This made thrifts vulnerable to periodic
bouts of disintermediation when market rates exceeded permissible inter-
est rate ceilings. While the interest rate ceilings created periodic
problems in funding new mortgage originations, they also acted like a
governor that prevents an engine from running too fast and overheating.
Because the limitation on interest rates made it difficult for institutions to
grow rapidly in size, there was time for a slow regulatory system to dis-
cover and correct problem situations.
In the 1970s, extended periods of inflation and interest rate volatility
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led to the development of consumer-oriented financial products, such as
money market mutual funds, that paid market rates of interest.' This
caused depository institutions to lose large volumes of their controlled-
rate federally insured deposits, and they did not have the authority to
offer comparable uninsured products.2 In response to these develop-
ments, Congress enacted legislation in 1980 that authorized negotiable
orders of withdrawal (NOW) accounts and established a schedule for the
deregulation of interest rates paid to depositors. 3 The 1980 legislation
also increased the amount of federal deposit insurance per account from
$40,000 to $100,000.
Although the expansion of deposit insurance coverage and the removal
of interest rate limitations enabled thrift institutions to attract deposits,
they continued to be vulnerable to interest rate risk caused by the con-
centration of their assets. The average cost of funds for thrift institutions
rose from seven percent in 1978 to just over 11 percent in 1982, but the
preponderance of long-term, fixed-rate mortgages in thrift portfolios pre-
vented a corresponding increase in revenues.4 In both 1981 and 1982,
the average cost of funds actually exceeded the average return on mort-
gages. On a true market value basis, the thrift industry as a whole was
probably insolvent as early as the mid-1970s. It has been estimated that,
by 1981, the thrift industry was underwater on a mark-to-market basis
by more than $100 billion.5
Thrift institutions also experienced new competition in their lending
activities due to the growth of increasingly efficient secondary markets
for mortgage-backed securities. Because the origination function often
could be performed by mortgage bankers and others at lower cost, the
thrift industry's share of new mortgage originations began to decline af-
1. The assets held by money market mutual funds grew from S 10.9 billion in 1978 to
$206.6 billion in 1982. See Investment Co. Inst., Mutual Fund Fact Book 78 (1990).
2. It should be noted that this loss of deposits was only partial. Money market funds
purchased substantial volumes of certificates of deposit and other securities of banks,
thereby returning these funds to the depository system.
3. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
4. Thrifts were restrained from reducing their interest-rate vulnerability because the
regulatory policies of the FHLBB, which were backed by strong Congressional support,
did not authorize federally-chartered thrifts to offer adjustable rate mortgages during the
late 1970s. These types of mortgages were not authorized for federal thrifts until June
1981. See Adjustable Mortgage Loan Instruments, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1981).
5. See E. Kane, The S&L Insurance Mess: How Did It Happen? 75 (1989). Kane
estimates that in 1978, on a mark-to-market basis, the thrift industry had a negative net
worth of between 6.87 percent ($35.1 billion) to 10.31 percent ($52.7 billion) of total
industry assets. See id. Kane also estimates that by 1981, the negative net worth had
increased to between 15.41 percent ($100.3 billion) and 23.12 percent ($150.5 billion) of
assets. See id.; see also Statement of Richard T. Pratt before the House Comm. on Bank-
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (October 1, 1990)[hereinafter
Pratt Testimony]. Mr. Pratt, who was the Chairman of the FHLBB from April 1981 to
April 1983, testified that it would have cost approximately $178 billion to liquidate the
thrift industry in 1981. See id.
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ter 1976.6 In order to maintain its viability, the thrift industry pressed
for an easing of restrictions on the types of investments and lines of busi-
ness permitted for thrift institutions. In 1982, Congress enacted legisla-
tion that authorized federally-chartered thrifts to invest up to 40 percent
of their assets in nonresidential real estate lending, and to invest as much
as 30 percent of assets in consumer loans.7 These changes in federal law
allowing greater diversification by federally-chartered thrifts were mod-
est compared to the actions of California, Texas and certain other states,
which in the early 1980s essentially removed all portfolio or business ac-
tivity limitations.' Thus, statutory change at both the state and federal
level altered the lending activities and the overall risk pattern of the thrift
industry.
If implemented in a prudent manner, the authority to diversify assets
was a means to reduce, rather than increase, the risk structure of the
thrifts. Indeed, Congressional action to reduce the dependency of thrifts
on fixed-rate mortgage lending was long overdue by the early 1980s.
Firms often incur heavy start-up losses, however, when they enter new
lines of finance or other types of business without experience or market
share. Moreover, because many thrifts were already economically insol-
vent, the owners of such institutions had no incentive to minimize the
risks associated with their entry into new lines of business. Unfortu-
nately, new thrift lending powers were not restricted to those institutions
with high levels of tangible capital, or to capitalized holding company
affiliates precluded from drawing on the capital or funding of the thrift
itself. Such limitations could have significantly limited the risk to the
deposit insurance fund resulting from otherwise sensible product
diversification.
The legislative and regulatory changes effected during the early 1980's
transformed an industry that had been characterized by slow growth due
to limited funds availability into an industry that was capable of explo-
sive growth.9 There was no market discipline to control this growth be-
cause depositors protected by federal deposit insurance were indifferent
to the financial health of the institutions to which they lent money. In-
deed, the removal of interest rate ceilings led to the emergence of a
brokered deposit business that directed funds toward institutions paying
the highest rate of interest, which generally were the institutions in finan-
cial difficulty.
6. See L. White, The S&L Debacle 21 (1990)
7. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
8. See, e.g., Cal. Fin. Code § 7250 (West 1989)(securities investment limitations and
exceptions).
9. Another factor that contributed to growth was the liberalization of FHLBB regu-
lations regarding the conversion of federally chartered institutions from mutual to stock
organizations. Billions of dollars in proceeds from conversions were added to the capital
of institutions which could then leverage those funds for rapid asset growth.
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B. Thrift Capital Levels
Capital requirements are the most powerful source of discipline for
financial institutions. When maintained at an appropriate level, capital
requirements reduce the incentive to take excessive risks and provide a
cushion against loss. A meaningful capital standard also serves as a
check against uncontrolled growth, since the permissible level of invest-
ment is directly tied to capital requirements.
The thrift industry was permitted to engage in unchecked expansion
because thrift regulators consistently acted in a manner that eroded the
discipline of a capital standard during the period when it was most neces-
sary. In response to widespread industry problems, the FHLBB first
lowered its capital requirements from five percent to four percent in No-
vember 1980,10 and then further reduced them to three percent in Janu-
ary 1982.11 Thus, just as thrifts obtained vast new abilities to raise
deposits, the regulatory agency acted to increase nominal industry lever-
age from 20:1 to over 33:1.
In practice, the discipline that might have been provided by capital
requirements was significantly eroded by two other FHLBB regulations,
known as the "five-year averaging" and "20-year phase-in" provisions.
These provisions, which relaxed capital requirements for rapidly growing
and newly-chartered thrifts, respectively, were originally designed to per-
mit a gradual building of reserves and net worth by mutual institutions
financing residential mortgages in local markets. They led to disastrous
results, however, when used by institutions that could attract deposits on
a nationwide basis and also engage in commercial and development lend-
ing and direct investments.
The "five-year averaging" provision was adopted by the FHLBB in
December 1972.12 This regulation permitted thrifts to base the calcula-
tion of their minimum net worth and reserve requirements on average
liabilities and deposits over the five year period comprising the year of
the calculation and the preceding four years, rather than on current lia-
bilities and deposits. 3 This method of computation provided the great-
est reduction of capital requirements for those thrifts that had expanded
most aggressively.
The "20-year phase-in" provision lowered capital requirements for a
newly-chartered thrift by permitting it to determine its capital require-
ments by multiplying three percent of its liabilities by the fraction of
twenty years that it had been covered by deposit insurance. Thus, a
thrift in its first year of operations needed to have only one-twentieth of
10. See Net Worth Amendment, 45 Fed. Reg. 76,111 (1980).
11. See Net Worth Amendment, 47 Fed. Reg. 3,543 (1982).
12. See 37 Fed. Reg. 26,579 (1972). The original provision called for three-year aver-
aging. See 36 Fed. Reg. 21,667 (1971).
13. The minimum net worth requirement was computed as a percentage of total lia-
bilities, and the minimum statutory reserve requirement was computed as a percentage of
insured deposits.
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the normally required reserves and net worth. By permitting a debt-to-
equity ratio as high as 666 to one, this provision essentially eliminated
any meaningful capital restrictions on growth for the newest and most
inexperienced thrifts trying to break into a volatile and changing indus-
try. Prior to November 1983, when the FHLBB eliminated, for new but
not existing institutions, use of the 20 year phase-in provision, a new
institution could leverage $2 million in initial capital stock or pledged
savings to support $1.3 billion in liabilities after the first year. 4
The reduction of capital requirements, when combined with the ac-
counting practices sanctioned by the FHLBB, permitted thrifts that had
little or no capital base to engage in high-velocity expansion. Indeed,
from year-end 1980 to year-end 1984, aggregate thrift assets grew from
$618 billion to $979 billion. During the same period, aggregate industry
tangible capital (Le., capital less goodwill and other intangible assets) fell
from more than $32 billion to only $4 billion." With virtually no tangi-
ble capital at risk, thrift operators had nothing to lose and everything to
gain by adopting a strategy of rapid growth and enormous risk-taking.
In fact, it was precisely those thrifts in the most precarious position that
had the greatest incentive to engage in speculative business activities. In
December 1983, at a time when thrift assets were approximately $820
billion, the Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services (Task
Group), which was chaired by then-Vice President Bush and included
the heads of all federal financial regulatory agencies, made an initial rec-
ommendation that the FHLBB be required to use the same capital stan-
dards (as well as the same accounting principles for determining such
capital) as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). This
recommendation was thereafter included in the final report issued by the
Task Group in 1984.6 Unfortunately, legislation to implement this rec-
ommendation was not enacted until the passage of the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in August
1989.17 By that time, aggregate thrift assets had grown to approximately
$1.25 trillion, an increase of roughly $430 billion from the level that ex-
isted when the Task Group made its initial recommendation to tighten
thrift capital and accounting standards.
14. See Reserve Requirements and Policies Relating to Insurance of Accounts of de
Novo Institutions, 48 Fed. Reg. 54,320, 54,324 (1983).
15. See R. Brumbaugh, Jr., Thrifts Under Siege: Restoring Order to American Bank-
ing 50-52 (1988).
16. See Blueprint for Reform: The Report of the Task Group on Regulation of Fi-
nancial Services 82 (1984).
17. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and
15 U.s.c.).
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II. THE MISUSE OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS TO CONCEAL
INDUSTRY PROBLEMS AND FACILITATE EXPANSION
A. The Distinction Between RAP and GAAP
Regulatory Accounting Principles (RAP) are accounting standards es-
tablished by regulatory agencies to monitor compliance with statutory
and administrative requirements. In the case of federally insured deposi-
tory institutions, RAP govern the financial reports that are submitted to
the relevant federal oversight agency. The appropriate use of RAP
should require a regulated firm to calculate earnings and net worth on a
basis that is more conservative than generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples (GAAP) might be interpreted to permit.
By contrast, GAAP are established by private sector standard setters
such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB")18 and the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA").'9 This
development of standards by the professional accounting bodies takes
place under oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC" or "Commission"). GAAP, including those principles that spe-
cifically address the financial services industries, provide the framework
for the accounting measurements and disclosures that are required for
the sale of securities and periodic financial reports under the federal se-
curities laws.
During the early 1980s, thrift RAP were significantly more lenient
than GAAP. For example, thrifts were permitted by RAP: (1) to amor-
tize realized losses on assets sold over the remaining contractual life of
the assets; (2) to record loan origination fees as income on a basis more
liberal than that permitted by GAAP; and (3) to increase capital by the
amount that certain assets had appreciated above recorded depreciated
cost, without recognizing the decrease in value of other assets.
Thrift regulators also tolerated flawed interpretations of GAAP that
enabled the regulated entities to comply with the lowered capital require-
ments. As a result, thrift institutions: (1) amortized acquisition costs in
excess of net tangible assets over 40 years, while booking income on the
discounted market value of the acquired assets over 10 years; (2) acceler-
ated income on certain real estate investments; and (3) capitalized losses
on speculative forward commitments. 2
18. The FASB issues guidance in the form of Statements of Financial Accounting
Standards ("FAS"), Interpretations, Technical Bulletins, Statements of Financial Ac-
counting Concepts and minutes of The Emerging Issues Task Force.
19. The AICPA issues guidance in the form of Notices to Practitioners, Industry
Audit and Accounting Guides, Statements of Position, Accounting Interpretations, Issue
Papers and Accounting Standards Executive Committee ("AcSEC") Practice Bulletins.
20. While this article focuses on the impact of accounting standards sanctioned by the
regulators, it is also fair to ask whether those standards were appropriately applied by
financial institutions and accounting firms. As the numerous lawsuits against accounting
firms suggest, there are substantial questions about whether accounting firms fulfilled
their obligations.
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The Commission's authority to regulate the disclosures made in regis-
tration statements and periodic financial reports includes publicly-held
holding companies that own banks and savings and loan associations.
Securities issued directly by depository institutions, however, are gener-
ally exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of
1933 ("Securities Act").21 Similarly, pursuant to Section 12(i) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"),22 the federal agencies
that regulate depository institutions administer the disclosure provisions
of that Act with respect to banks and thrifts. Thus, the securities laws,
designed to protect investors, were interpreted and administered with re-
spect to thrifts by the FHLBB, an agency primarily concerned with the
financial health of thrifts, not their investors.
B. RAP That Inflated Reported Capital
1. Deferral of Losses on the Sale of Assets
The FHLBB's most indefensible use of RAP was a regulation designed
to encourage thrift institutions to liquidate long-term mortgage loans
that could be sold only at a substantial discount in the high-interest rate
environment of the early 1980s. Both GAAP and RAP allowed such
loans to be carried at cost, without reflecting the dramatic loss in market
value that had occurred. Although this failure to reflect economic reality
had the effect of significantly overstating earnings and net worth, GAAP
at least required immediate recognition of a loss the event that any such
assets were sold.
To encourage portfolio restructuring, the FHLBB made an offer to
thrift institutions that many could not refuse. A regulation adopted in
1981 permitted thrifts to book the entire amount of losses realized on the
sale of mortgage loans as an asset for RAP purposes. This accumulated
loss could then be amortized over the remaining contractual life of the
assets sold.23 For example, if a thrift sold a portfolio of mortgages with a
$500 million face amount for $350 million, it could treat the realized loss
of $150 million as an asset included in net worth. This meant that the
thrift could maintain its current level of activity without injecting new
capital, notwithstanding a $150 million reduction in the real value of the
enterprise. The thrift also received a tax benefit from the transaction,
since the sale resulted in the recognition of a $150 million loss for tax
purposes.
One can argue that financial institutions should be allowed to carry
21. See, eg., Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, 48 Stat. 74, § 3(a)(2) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1988))(banks); id. § 3(a)(5) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77(a)(5) (1988))(savings and loans).
22. See ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, § 12(i) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 781(i)
(1988)).
23. See Treatment of Gains and Losses on the Sale or Other Disposition of Mortgage
Assets, Mortgage-Related Securities, and Debt Securities; Republication of Reserve Re-
quirements, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,048 (1981).
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assets at their historical cost on the assumption that they will be held to
maturity. However, the loss deferral rule essentially permitted thrift in-
stitutions to carry assets at historical cost even after they had been sold, a
result that Alice would have found outlandish even by the standards of
Wonderland. The release issued by the FHLBB in adopting this rule
stated that its purpose was to assist institutions that were "inhibited"
from undertaking mortgage disposition programs because GAAP re-
quired immediate recognition of a loss. As discussed in Section In of
this article, the use of mark-to-market accounting would eliminate any
incentive to hold assets that can be sold only at a discount from book
value.
The deferral of losses on assets sold created a major divergence be-
tween GAAP and RAP measures of net worth. Deferred losses exceeded
$6.3 billion, or thirteen percent of reported regulatory net worth, as of
December 31, 1985.24 Under the FHLBB's capital levels at the time, this
$6.3 billion in accumulated losses was sufficient to support $207.9 billion
in loans.
2. Loan Origination Fees
Beginning in 1979, thrifts were allowed to recognize income from con-
struction loan origination fees on a basis more liberal than that permitted
by GAAP. For purposes of computing regulatory net worth, thrifts were
allowed to recognize income from construction loan fees equal to 2.5 per-
cent of the loan amount, immediately upon origination of a loan. 5 Thus,
for a $20 million construction loan, RAP would allow a thrift to record
$500,000 in loan fee income ($20 million x .025) on the day of closing.
By contrast, GAAP allows immediate recognition of loan fee income
only to the extent of costs incurred in originating loans, which in this
example might reasonably have been $100,000 or less. The remainder of
the fees are taken into income ratably over the life of the loan if it re-
mains current, or upon sale.
For RAP purposes, the earnings arising from loan fees were greatest
for those thrifts with significant construction loan volume. This almost
certainly induced many institutions to enter into additional construction
loans (however risky) in order to generate immediate income. A thrift
making $1 billion per year in new construction loans, for example, could
report $25 million per year in income from loan origination fees, even
though the loans might be extraordinarily speculative and unlikely to be
repaid.
Thrifts had a particularly strong incentive to promote rapid growth in
24. See Brumbaugh, supra note 15, at 44.
25. See Insurance of Accounts, Amendments Relating to Acquisition Credit Subject
to Deferral, 44 Fed. Reg. 76,567 (1979). With respect to loans other than construction
loans, thrifts could recognize income equal to two percent of the loan amount, plus $400
if the institution's employees performed appraisal, attorney, or loan closing services for
which no escrow fee was charged.
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deposits that could be lent out on those projects paying the highest
"points", or origination fees. Due to the operation of the "five-year aver-
aging" and 20-year phase-in provisions, the amount that a thrift ac-
cepting $1 billion in new deposits would have to increase its capital could
be less than $10 million. At the same time, the thrift could generate as
much as $25 million in income by using the deposits to fund construction
loans. This may explain why annual growth rates of 1,000% or more
were not uncommon in the thrift industry.
3. Appraised Equity Capital
Beginning in late 1982, the FHLBB permitted thrift institutions to in-
lude an item called "appraised equity capital" when computing their
regulatory net worth. Appraised equity capital represented the amount
that certain capital assets (eg., property and equipment) had appreciated
above their recorded depreciated cost.26 The rule permitted thrift institu-
tions to recognize appreciation in the value of buildings even where those
assets had not been sold, with a corresponding increase in net worth for
RAP purposes.
Although a market value approach to accounting generally should
measure an entity's net worth more accurately than an historical cost
accounting approach, the thrifts were permitted to reflect market value
on a totally selective basis. Only those adjustments that increased the
value of certain assets were made, and there was no obligation to recog-
nize the far greater decrease in value of other assets. Moreover, each
dollar of capital that a thrift created by reappraising its assets permitted
it to raise at least $33 by offering insured deposits to the public.
The release issued by the FHLBB when adopting this rule frankly ac-
knowledged that it was a departure from GAAP that was intended "to
maintain public confidence in the industry during this period of financial
and operational transition." 7 The FHLBB also noted that, because the
use of financial statements that depart from GAAP "may raise ques-
tions" under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, thrift
institutions "subject to such limitations" should refrain from disseminat-
ing financial statements that included appraised equity capital.2" It
should be noted that the FHLBB, while engaging in this effort to prop up
the thrift industry, was also responsible for reviewing the disclosure doc-
uments of thrifts that were offering shares to the public, a blatant conflict
of interest.
In 1985, the FHLBB extended the "sunset" date of the appraised eq-
uity capital rule for another year. At the time, the FHLBB noted that
appraised equity capital represented a "real, though unrealized" equity
value that, in case of merger or liquidation, would serve to protect the
26. Amendments to Net Worth and Statutory Reserve Requirements, 47 Fed. Reg.
52,961 (1982).
27. Id. at 52,962.
28. Id. at 52,964.
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interests of the insurance fund just as much as "more traditional" forms
of capital. 29 The appraised equity capital rule resulted in an estimated
increase to reported regulatory net worth of $2.2 billion as of December
31, 1986, when the rule became ineffective.3"
C. Accounting Interpretations
1. Purchase and Goodwill Accounting
While the preceding examples involved the promulgation of RAP that
departed from the requirements of GAAP, the deception sponsored by
thrift regulators also extended to the misapplication of GAAP. The most
egregious distortions of GAAP involved treatments of goodwill that were
designed to make the acquisition of troubled thrifts (thrifts whose liabili-
ties exceeded the market value of their assets) more attractive.
The concept of goodwill is based on a premise that, when a business is
acquired in an arms-length transaction for an amount that exceeds the
aggregate book value of its assets, there must be an intangible asset that
accounts for the difference. The concept assumes, in other words, that a
buyer will not overpay for the acquired assets. This basic premise was
questionable in the case of many thrift acquisitions, however, in which
the buyer assumed the excess liabilities of a thrift that was incurring sub-
stantial losses. In fact, many thrift acquisitions took place only because
the FHLBB interpreted GAAP in a manner that enabled the buyer of an
insolvent thrift to generate immediate accounting profits.
When a troubled thrift was acquired, its assets (mostly long-term
mortgages which had depreciated in value as a result of changes in inter-
est rates) were recorded on the buyer's books at fair market value in
accordance with GAAP. The "discount," or difference between the orig-
inal book value and the fair market value, was booked as income over the
estimated life of the assets on an interest-method basis. The net liabilities
(Le., the fair value of total liabilities less the fair value of the assets ac-
quired) were recorded as goodwill and expended on a straight-line basis
over an amortization period.
GAAP recognize that there is considerable judgment to be applied in
determining the appropriate amortization period for goodwill, specifying
only that the goodwill be amortized over the period benefited, not to ex-
ceed 40 years. If a thrift used the maximum 40-year period, the yearly
"expense" for goodwill would be one-fortieth of the total amount. Be-
cause the typical life of the purchased assets usually averaged about 10
years, however, this would mean that the "discount" was recorded as
income over a shorter period. Thus, the income from amortizing the
purchase discount would exceed the expense from goodwill, and the ac-
quiring thrift would generate net income during the first 10 years after
the acquisition. Because the amount of these paper profits immediately
29. Appraised Equity Capital, 50 Fed. Reg. 45,988 (1985).
30. See Brumbaugh, supra note 15, at 44.
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following the acquisition was directly tied to the amount of goodwill am-
ortized over a longer period, the biggest boost to profits was realized by
the buyers who acquired the weakest thrifts."1
The distortions caused by goodwill accounting were clearly under-
stood by the FHLBB. From 1974 to 1981, in fact, FHLBB guidance
required thrifts to amortize goodwill over no more than 10 years.32 In
1980, the FHLBB proposed a regulation to codify this guidance and to
require that a goodwill amortization period be matched with the accre-
tion of discounts on acquired assets, stating that "[t]he use of different
accounting periods in this instance may give rise to distortions in net
worth levels and computations." 33
In August 1981, however, the FHLBB reversed course and directed its
staff to eliminate this restriction on the acceptable goodwill amortization
period.34 The FHLBB's release withdrawing the proposed regulation
stated that "[u]pon further consideration, the Board has determined to
allow the application of generally accepted accounting principles in this
area without regulatory restriction."35 Ironically, this release was issued
31. The impact of this provision can be seen in the treatment of an acquisition of a
troubled thrift whose assets had lost $1 billion in actual value from a face amount of $3
billion. In this circumstance, a buyer that assumed the net assets would have recorded
liabilities of $3 billion, loans of $2 billion and goodwill of $1 billion. Absent payment
defaults, in subsequent years the loan balance would be gradually increased to correspond
to the principal payments of $3 billion. These increases would result directly in additions
to interest income of $1 billion. Assuming the loans have an average estimated maturity
of ten years, and that the income is recognized on a straight-line basis, income will be
increased by $100 million in the first year solely as a result of this amortization practice.
Assuming the goodwill is amortized over 40 years, the goodwill expense will be $25 mil-
lion in the first year, resulting in a net increase to net worth of $75 million (before tax)
after one year and $750 million after 10 years. Further, since GAAP require amortiza-
tion of loan discounts using the interest method, the enhancement of income in the earlier
years is amplified.
32. See FHLBB Memorandum R-31a (March 8, 1974).
33. 45 Fed. Reg. 72,661, 72,662 (1980).
34. See Treatment of Goodwill Acquired in Mergers, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,274 (1981).
35. While this accounting treatment of goodwill purportedly was based on GAAP,
the SEC refused to allow thrift holding companies reporting to the Commission to amor-
tize goodwill over a period longer than 25 years. Shorter periods were required when the
transaction involved a troubled institution. This position was embodied in Staff Account-
ing Bulletin ("SAB") No. 42, an interpretative release issued in 1981. The FASB ulti-
mately adopted the general concepts of this interpretive position as an industry-specific
GAAP, see Statement of Concepts No. 72, Accounting for Certain Acquisitions of Bank-
ing or Thrift Institutions (Fin. Accounting Standards Board 1983), issued in February
1983. FAS No. 72 requires that goodwill, to the extent that it results from the assump-
tion of excess liabilities, be amortized on an interest method over the life of the interest
bearing assets acquired. It also requires that regulatory assistance be netted against good-
will.
SAB No. 42A was issued in December 1985 to deal with issues relating to the forma-
tion of thrift holding companies that become Commission registrants. This SAB indi-
cated that the use by such companies of the long goodwill amortization periods permitted
in their filings with the FHLBB would not be acceptable in Commission filings. It further
noted concerns with the use in Commission filings of purchase accounting (with 40-year
goodwill) for mergers of failing institutions.
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on the same day that the FHLBB proposed a regulation that diverged
from GAAP by permitting the deferral of losses on assets sold, based on
a concern that thrift institutions contemplating asset disposition pro-
grams were "inhibited" by GAAP.
The ability to extend the amortization of goodwill had the effect of
increasing the apparent profitability of acquiring institutions, as well as
increasing the overall capital of the thrift industry by eliminating the cap-
ital shortage of the insolvent thrifts. In 1982 alone, over $15 billion in
goodwill was created in purchase transactions, thereby enabling thrifts to
maintain approximately $500 billion in deposits and to make an
equivalent volume of loans without a single dollar of tangible capital in-
vestment. In that year, goodwill as a percentage of total industry GAAP
capital rose from six percent to approximately eighty-two percent.36
The distortions created by goodwill accounting reached their zenith in
what were referred to as "Phoenix" transactions. When it became too
difficult to solicit financially sound buyers, the regulators would select
several thrifts, usually all of which were insolvent, and designate one of
the insolvent thrifts as the purchaser of the others. By applying purchase
accounting and goodwill concepts, the new thrift formed by the combina-
tion immediately generated reported profits and positive net worth.
2. Acquisition, Development and Construction Loans
During the 1980s, many thrift institutions engaged in types of transac-
tions involving the funding of real estate development that were mis-
characterized as lending activity. The structure of these acquisition,
development, and construction ("ADC") loans typically gave the finan-
cial institution the risks and rewards of investor participation, rather
than a lender's normal return of principal and market rate of interest.
Because GAAP require that accounting treatments reflect the substance
of transactions rather than their form, these ostensible "loans" should
have been accounted for as joint venture transactions.
Financial institutions had an incentive to characterize these transac-
tions as loans because it enabled them to inflate reported income. When
a $10 million mortgage at twelve percent is legitimately structured as a
loan, for example, a lender may normally recognize interest income of at
least $1.2 million per year.37 By contrast, it is inappropriate to accrue
interest when a transaction should be accounted for as a joint venture.3"
36. Black, Ending Our Forebearers' Forbearance" FIRREA and Supervisory Goodwill,
Stanford L. & Pol'y Rev. 102, 106 (Spr. 1990)(citing Brumbaugh, supra note 15, at 40-41,
50).
37. As noted earlier, RAP treatment of loan fees resulted in substantial additional
income in the period that the loan was made.
38. Where the transaction is accounted for as a joint venture, the financial institution
might be able to capitalize the interest payment, which would increase the carrying
amount of the asset. The benefit to the financial institution of this accounting treatment,
however, would be less than the benefit of including interest income.
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ADC loans proved to be a major problem area, as thrifts suffered large
losses from high risk investments improperly accounted for as loans. 39
Given the judgmental nature of the accounting requirements in this area,
and the temptation to report investments as loans (thereby obtaining up-
front fee income and accelerated recognition of interest), unequivocal
guidance and strict enforcement were essential. The FHLBB, however,
failed to prevent abuses in many cases.
To assist institutions and auditors in evaluating the substance of ADC
transactions, the AICPA published a series of guidelines beginning in
1983. 40 In October 1984, the FHLBB proposed to adopt a statement of
policy concerning the regulatory accounting for certain real estate activi-
ties.41 This policy, which was intended to be consistent with the
AICPA's guidelines, was not adopted until April 1985, and was applica-
ble only to transactions occurring after that date.42
3. Repurchase Transactions
During the mid-1980s, some financial institutions engaged in certain
speculative forward commitment transactions, known as "dollar-rolls,"
that were accounted for as borrowing/lending (financing) arrangements.
The effect of accounting for these transactions as financing was to defer
loss (or gain) recognition.
The most significant example of this practice involved Financial Cor-
poration of America ("FCA"), a public holding company. FCA had to-
tal assets of $10.7 billion and stockholders' equity of $219 million by
June 30, 1983. During the third quarter of 1983, FCA acquired Ameri-
can Savings & Loan Association, which approximately doubled FCA's
asset base, initiated a program of purchases of securities financed by re-
purchase agreements and aggressively sought brokered deposits. By Sep-
tember 1984, FCA's assets had more than tripled to $32.4 billion, and
repurchase obligations represented approximately twenty-two percent
($7 billion) of total assets.
In mid-1984, the Commission concluded that FCA's investment and
repurchase transactions were, in substance, forward commitments to
39. See, e.g., Federal Home Loan Bank Board's Supervision and Failure of Empire
Savings and Loan Association of Mesquite, Texas, House Comm. on Government Opera-
tions, H.R. Rep. No. 953, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1984)(discussing impact of high-risk
investments in Empire failure).
40. See, e.g., Notice to Practitioners, "Certain Real Estate Lending Activities of Fi-
nancial Institutions" (November 1983)(AIPCA guidelines); Notice to Practitioners,
"ADC Loans" (November 1984)(same). In February 1986, the AICPA issued new and
expanded guidance which encompassed the earlier notices. See Notice to Practitioners,
"ADC Arrangements" (November 1986). The guidance was generally consistent with
how the Commission staff applied the accounting literature.
41. See 49 Fed. Reg. 43,557 (1984).
42. See Statement of Policy, Accounting for Acquisition, Development and Construc-
tion Loans, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,233 (1985). Even then, however, the adopting release stated
that "classification of ADC transactions is best left to the insured institution and its in-
dependent public accountant." Id. at 18,235 (1985).
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purchase securities. Because such commitments are speculative transac-
tions rather than leveraged investments, they must be marked-to-market
under GAAP. When the Commission required FCA to restate its finan-
cial statements and recognize a loss of $155 million on the forward com-
mitment transactions, American Savings and Loan Association
depositors withdrew $6.84 billion of deposits during a single quarter. Ul-
timately, FCA became insolvent, resulting in a loss to the public of bil-
lions of dollars.
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The enactment of FIRREA, by mandating higher capital levels and
restricting the use of RAP by thrift regulators, has eliminated most of the
abuses discussed in this article. Two additional measures are necessary,
however, in order to assure the integrity and relevance of financial state-
ments disseminated to the public by banks and thrifts. First, the registra-
tion requirements of the Securities Act should be made applicable to
publicly-offered securities of banks and thrifts, and the administration
and enforcement of Exchange Act disclosure requirements for banks and
thrifts should be transferred from the bank and thrift regulatory agencies
to the SEC. Second, there should be a movement towards a greater use
of market value accounting in the financial reports that are publicly dis-
seminated by banks and thrifts.
A. Functional Regulation
Banks and thrifts that are not part of a holding company are exempted
from the uniform application of the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act. The Securities Act has, since its inception, exempted financial insti-
tutions from its registration requirements for public offerings of securi-
ties. With respect to the Exchange Act, Section 12(i) provides that the
bank and thrift regulatory authorities shall have the authority "to admin-
ister and enforce" the registration requirements of Section 12, the peri-
odic reporting requirements of Section 13, the proxy and tender offer
provisions of Section 14, and the insider reporting and trading liability
provisions of Section 16.
Our experience with the savings and loan industry illustrates why it is
bad policy to exempt banks and thrifts from the uniform application of
the federal securities laws. The FHLBB, throughout the period in which
it permitted the use of unsound accounting practices, was responsible for
protecting the federal deposit insurance fund. At the same time, it was
also responsible for reviewing thrift financial statements that were dis-
seminated to public investors. This dual responsibility represented a seri-
ous conflict, since every dollar of equity that the thrifts could raise from
43. Exchange Act, supra note 22, § 12(1) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 781(1)
(1988)).
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public investors benefitted the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration (FSLIC).
The FHLBB consistently resolved this conflict in favor of the chroni-
cally underfunded FSLIC. As former FHLBB Chairman Richard Pratt
recently testified before Congress, in defending the FHLBB treatment of
goodwill:
The Bank Board was caught between a rock and a hard place. While it
did not have sufficient resources to close all insolvent institutions, at
the same time, it had to consolidate the industry, move weaker institu-
tions into stronger hands, and do everything possible to minimize
losses during the transition period. Goodwill was an indispensable tool
in performing this task.44
Because the FHLBB was preoccupied with minimizing losses to FSLIC,
it evaluated accounting standards by how well they performed that task.
The FHLBB treatment of goodwill was relaxed in order to make it a
better "tool." At the same time, when GAAP proved to be an "inhibi-
tion" against mortgage disposition programs, the FHLBB adopted its
loss deferral regulation.45
In order for financial statements to be useful, they must be credible
and neutral measurements of business reality. It is therefore essential
that accounting principles be established through a standard-setting and
review process, overseen by a single agency, that is immune from tamper-
ing by a failed industry or its regulators. If financial regulators are per-
mitted to determine how the activities of regulated institutions will be
measured and reported to the public, the danger of thumbs on the scale
will always be present.
Uniform administration of the federal securities laws is also necessary
to ensure investor confidence. Although the federal deposit insurance
system protects insured depositors, and has often been administered in a
manner that protects uninsured depositors and even general creditors, it
affords no protection to common shareholders. The losses suffered by
shareholders as a result of bank and thrift failures over the past five years
exceed $10 billion.
The low price/earnings multiples of many money center banks may
reflect the fact that investors view their financial reports with skepticism.
This lack of confidence affects the entire industry, and raises the cost of
capital for the strong institutions as well as the weak.
44. Pratt Testimony, supra note 5, at 81.
45. Martin Mayer's recent book on the savings and loan crisis describes how Pratt, in
urging the FASB to endorse the loss deferral rule, argued that it was necessary in light of
the industry's desperate condition. The FASB refused to do so. As Donald Kirk, the
former Chairman of the FASB, stated: "FASB took the position, 'You can be tolerant,
but stop monkeying with the balance sheet.' If you want to set capital requirements at
one percent, or minus one percent, do it. You have the legal right to do it, but stop
concealing the condition of the institution." M. Mayer, The Greatest-Ever Bank Rob-
bery, 73 (1990).
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The SEC has long advocated repeal of Exchange Act Section 12(i) and
modification of Securities Act Sections 3(a)(2) and 3(a)(5). In 1984, the
Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services recommended such
changes as a means of providing better and more consistent protection to
investors at lower cost. The Department of the Treasury has recently
included the same recommendation in its report on the federal deposit
insurance system.46
B. Market Value Accounting
The nation's experience with the savings and loan industry demon-
strates the substantial danger of a reporting system for financial institu-
tions that is premised on historical cost accounting principles.4 7 Because
GAAP failed to reflect massive unrealized losses in savings and loan
portfolios, institutions that were deeply insolvent on an economic basis
continued to operate and to report a positive net worth. Besides tending
to legitimize a policy of regulatory forbearance, the absence of adequate
market-based information made it difficult for investors to make a mean-
ingful assessment of the real economic value and risk exposure of a de-
pository institution. We should therefore explore the extent to which the
relevance and credibility of bank and thrift financial statements can be
enhanced by a broader application of market value accounting.
Under the most comprehensive application of market value account-
ing, depository institutions would be required to reflect in their financial
reports the fair market value of their assets, liabilities, and off-balance
sheet items. This would enable regulators and investors to assess more
precisely the true economic value and risk exposure of a depository insti-
tution. Besides facilitating more timely corrective action by regulators,
this approach would also aid private sector discipline by making the
managers of depository institutions more accountable for their invest-
ment and business decisions.
While the benefits of market value accounting would be substantial,
the approach raises complex valuation and auditing issues that must be
resolved before any decision is made to implement it on a comprehensive
basis." In particular, additional work is needed to develop reasonably
accurate and verifiable valuation techniques for assets, liabilities, and off-
46. See Dep't of Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: Recommendadons for
Safer, More Competitive Banks ch. IX (Feb. 1991)[herein r Treasury Report].
47. Under the historical cost model, most assets are recorded at their acquisition
price, which is presumed to be more objective. Departing from the historical cost rule
(Le., using the lower of cost or market, or "LOCOM") is generally done only when the
future utility (or revenue-producing ability) of an asset is less than its cost. Such differ-
ences should be recorded in the period in which they occur. See, eg., Statement of Con-
cepts No. 5, Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of Business
Enterprises 67-69 (Fin. Accounting Standards Board Dec. 1984); Accounting Re-
search Bulletin No. 43, ch. 4, 8, 9 (Accounting Principles Board).
48. For an examination of the issues raised by market value accounting, along with a
list of reference materials, see Treasury Report, supra note 46, cl. X.
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balance sheet commitments that do not trade in active markets. For
banks and thrifts, the most obvious illiquid assets are loans; everyone
agrees that market value accounting for these assets would be difficult
and perhaps impossible. There should also be an assurance that the
preparation and auditing costs associated with a comprehensive applica-
tion of market value accounting do not exceed the anticipated benefits.
Since May 1986, the FASB has been reexamining the standards for
recognition and measurement of financial instruments and transactions.
As part of this project, the FASB is assessing whether to expand the use
of market value data in financial statements and related disclosures. Due
to the complexity of the recognition and measurement issues, the FASB
determined that new disclosure standards should be issued as an interme-
diate step in the process. The most recent FASB proposal would require
all entities to disclose, either in the body of the financial statements or in
the accompanying notes, the market value of financial instruments for
which it is practicable to estimate that value.49
1. Accounting for Investment Securities
As noted above, the FASB's development of standards for increased
disclosure of market value information is part of a larger examination of
the manner in which financial instruments should be recognized and
measured. In November 1990, at the request of the AICPA, the FASB
voted to accelerate a separate portion of the financial instruments project
to consider market value accounting for debt securities held as assets.
Thus, it is possible that the use of market value accounting will be man-
dated for investment securities held by financial institutions.
GAAP currently permit a financial institution to classify its holdings
of securities into either a "trading" portfolio or an "investment" portfo-
lio. Securities in the trading portfolio must be reported at their current
market value. Securities classified as "investments", however, are carried
at cost (less provision for credit losses), unless it can be shown that the
institution does not have either the intent or the ability to hold the securi-
ties. As a result, what may be material fluctuations in the current market
value of investment securities are concealed in the institution's public
financial statements.
The accounting treatment currently accorded to investment securities
is based on the rationale that fluctuations in market value are irrelevant if
an institution professes an intent to hold an instrument to maturity,
when it may be redeemed at its face amount. It is questionable whether
management's current intent should ever dictate future business deci-
sions, however, as management has a continuing obligation to reassess
the most productive use of its assets. Moreover, the economic environ-
ment in which financial institutions now operate has led to sophisticated
49. Proposed Statement of Financial Accounting Standards, "Disclosures about Mar-
ket Value of Financial Instruments," (Fin. Accounting Standards Board Dec. 31, 1991).
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asset-liability management strategies, which undermine the presumption
that investment securities will be held to maturity.
In practice, management's intent to hold the securities is virtually im-
possible for auditors and others to validate, giving rise to an abusive
practice referred to as "gains trading". Simply put, institutions may sell
those "investment" securities that have risen in value, taking the profits
immediately into income, while continuing to hold and carry at cost
those securities that have fallen in value. Gains trading will continue to
be a problem so long as bank and thrift managers can generate income by
cherry-picking the bond portfolio without having to recognize losses on
the remaining securities that are not yet realized. The use of market
value accounting would eliminate any incentive to sell or retain invest-
ments for reasons of accounting treatment rather than business utility.
In response to gains trading abuses and other concerns, the AICPA
attempted to prepare and issue guidance on reporting by financial institu-
tions for debt securities held as assets. In May 1990, the AICPA pub-
lished for comment proposed rules intended to provide practical
guidelines for evaluating the intent and ability of an entity to hold securi-
ties to maturity.50 Because the comments on this proposal were generally
negative, the AICPA ultimately concluded that it should no longer con-
tinue attempts to clarify the meaning of existing guidance on the intent
and ability to hold. The AICPA then requested the FASB to consider
whether an objective standard, such as one based on market value mea-
surements, would be more appropriate in order to gain consistent
application.51
2. Opposition to Market Value Accounting
Banks have generally opposed the proposed use of market value ac-
counting for investment securities. They have been joined in this opposi-
tion, for the most part, by depository institution regulators. In reviewing
the debate over this proposal, it is important to distinguish what may be
referred to as "accounting issues" from policy objectives that are unre-
lated to the fair presentation of financial information.
It has been suggested, for example, that market valuation of invest-
ment securities may cause banks and thrifts to reduce their holdings of
government securities, thereby sacrificing liquidity and asset quality,
merely in order to avoid reporting unrealized losses. This concern
should not influence the debate, however, as accounting standards should
not be used to motivate business decisions. The depository institution
regulators have ample authority to require appropriate levels of portfolio
liquidity to satisfy prudential concerns, and institutions that place them-
selves into an illiquid condition would also be subject to market disci-
50. AICPA Exposure Draft of Proposed Statement of Position, "Reporting by Finan-
cial Institutions of Debt Securities Held as Assets" (May 25, 1990).
51. See "Text of CPA's Request to Accounting Standards Board," Am. Banker (Nov.
2, 1990).
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pline. Accordingly, the sole focus should be on the relevance and
materiality of market value information to a fair presentation of a firm's
financial condition.
In contrast to this type of concern, a relevant accounting issue that
should be considered is whether marking investment securities to market,
while continuing to measure other assets (such as real estate loans) and
other liabilities (such as deposits) at historical cost, could lead to volatil-
ity in reported earnings and capital that would not be indicative of a
depository institution's true financial condition. This distortion could
potentially result because, to the extent that depository institutions en-
gage in hedging strategies to minimize interest rate sensitivity, a partial
approach to market value accounting might require some gains and
losses to be recognized while not acknowledging offsetting changes in the
value of other assets, liabilities, or off-balance sheet items.
The FASB will consider this issue as part of its current project, and it
may ultimately conclude that "related liabilities" should be marked to
market in tandem with investment securities. The concern that a partial
approach to market value accounting would lead to distortion may, how-
ever, be overstated. Since many bank and thrift liabilities reprice within
one year, the divergence between their book value and their market value
should not be as great as that for investment securities with longer aver-
age maturities. Accordingly, the use of market value accounting for in-
vestment securities alone could lead to financial statements more
accurate than those used today, even if they did not attain theoretical
perfection.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of accounting standards is to assure that financial infor-
mation is presented in a manner that permits public and private decision-
makers to make informed judgments. In order to fulfill their purpose,
accounting standards must lead to financial information that is neutral
and reliable. Neutral information is that which objectively measures eco-
nomic activity, without seeking to influence behavior in any particular
direction.
The accounting practices used in the thrift industry during the past
decade demonstrate the danger of using accounting standards to imple-
ment policy objectives unrelated to the fair and accurate presentation of
financial information. Accounting standards were manipulated not only
to obscure the magnitude of the industry's problems, but also to facilitate
the growth of troubled thrifts. The thrift regulators viewed accounting
standards not as a means of objectively measuring economic reality, but
as a "tool" for implementing regulatory policy.
In this context, RAP became the financial equivalent of the Stealth
technology. Accounting standards were used to justify regulatory for-
bearance by making it impossible for creditors, investors and the public
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to be able to measure the size of the problems facing the industry. Sadly,
we discovered that encouraging the growth of insolvent firms led to lend-
ing practices that government supervision was unable to control. Be-
cause the accounting practices sanctioned by the regulators delayed the
public recognition that was essential to developing adequate funding and
other necessary responses to thrift insolvencies, the ultimate losses to the
government were greatly increased.
Although the worst abuses that characterized the accounting practices
of the thrift industry have been curbed by passage of FIRREA, preserv-
ing the neutrality of financial information continues to be critical. So
long as public policy and resource allocation decisions are influenced by
the presentation of financial information, there will always be parties
who urge the adoption of accounting standards that present such infor-
mation in the manner that best serves their particular interests. That is
exactly the foundation for the banking industry's resistance to an ac-
counting standard that would require banks to reflect fully losses that
they have incurred in their securities portfolios. It is therefore essential
that accounting standards be developed by an independent body that will
responsibly seek to ensure that the public receives, as Sergeant Friday
would have saild, "Just the facts, ma'am."
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